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District Magnitude and the 
Comparative Study of Strategic Voting
n om a s  Gschwend
Introduction1
Do electoral systems matter? The political consequences of electoral laws 
fall in two distinct categories. They encompass direct as well as indirect 
effects. The particular rules which determine how votes are generated into 
legislative seats have a direct impact on the number and the type of parties 
in a given polity. This has profound and well-known consequences for 
the type of government and the nature of representation in general. It is 
well known that the same distribution of votes can be translated in totally 
different distributions of seats in parliament using different electoral rules. 
If the outcome of an election is not just a foregone conclusion then the 
differences in the way votes are translated into seats may be a crucial 
determinant deciding who will govern and who has to stay put.
What is the impact of electoral rules, though, on the way people make 
decisions in the voting booth? Do voters actually care about electoral 
rules? Do such rules in some sense shape their electoral choice because 
they anticipate the outcome of an election and include these expectations 
in their decision calculus? If voters are systematically drawn away from 
their most preferred party, just because they realize that supporting a 
marginal party might be equivalent to wasting their vote given a par­
ticular electoral institution, then we speak of an indirect effect. Duverger's 
(1954) "psychological effects” are the prime example for these types of 
effects. In order to avoid wasting their votes, voters cast a strategic vote 
for a viable party (or candidate)2 although they most prefer another one.
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Duverger suggested that this logic should not apply to PR systems, since 
even marginal parties can expect to gain seats in such a system.
Contrary to Duverger's propositions, Leys (1959) and Sartori (1968) 
expect significant amounts of strategic voting even in PR systems—the 
more the smaller the district magnitude, that is, the less seats are awarded 
per electoral district. The Leys-Sartori conjecture posits that the various 
electoral institutions can be arrayed along a single dimension defined by 
the district magnitude and predicts that the smaller the district magnitude 
the more strategic voting we should expect at the primary district level, 
that is, at the level of the smallest geographic unit in which seats are 
allocated. The consequences of the frequency of strategic voting given 
varying district magnitudes, to my knowledge, have never been tested 
comparatively. Does the frequency of strategic voting at the electoral 
district depend on the number of seats that are awarded? In order to 
answer this question this chapter considers first the individual level and 
then aggregate voting decisions with regard to electoral district in order 
to be able to estimate the impact of district magnitude on the frequency 
of strategic voting.
The contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, based on a theory 
of how voters form expectations about the election outcome in their 
electoral district I propose a measure to operationalize strategic voting 
across more than 30 election studies using the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES) data Module 1. Second, I will test hypotheses 
about the relationship between the frequency of strategic voting and insti­
tutional incentives that are channeled cross-nationally through district 
magnitude. Third, I further provide some evidence that speaks directly to 
the controversy in the literature surrounding the question of how district 
magnitude effects should be modeled. Results yield support for the claim 
that district magnitude and frequency of strategic voting at the district 
level are negatively correlated.
A Comparative Look at Strategic Voting— Some 
Micro-Foundations
No matter whether you believe in the Columbia, Michigan, or Rochester 
school of thought, traditional theories of voting behavior have in com­
mon the prediction that voters should end up casting a vote for their 
most preferred party (or candidate). This is called a sincere vote. Students 
of strategic voting point out that we nevertheless observe systematic
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deviations from these traditional vote-choice predictions. In an attempt 
to model these deviations they suggest that voters do not merely take 
into account the utility that a voter derives from voting for her most 
preferred party (t/pref) but also the expectation about the outcome of the 
election, for instance whether the most preferred party is actually a viable 
alternative to win a seat in her primary electoral district (Blais 2002; Blais 
et al. 2001; Cox 1997; Fisher 2004). It is far from clear how voters actually 
form and weigh their expectations against their preferences. It is quite 
likely that different voters employ different decision rules.
The particular approach followed here is to assume that a voter's deci­
sion rule is to vote for a party that maximizes her expected utility from 
voting for viable parties. Thus, a strategic voter is someone who votes for a 
less-preferred party if the expected utility that this party is likely to gain 
a seat in their district is higher than the expected utility derived from a 
sincere vote, namely that their most preferred party has a viable shot at a 
seat in that district.
The probability that a voter expects her most preferred party to be 
viable to win a seat is denoted by /?pref. The expected utility, EU(pref), 
that her most preferred party is competitive as a viable alternative to 
gain a seat combines the traditional utility component weighted by the 
voter's expectation. Thus EU(pref) = ppref • t/pref- This also implies that with 
probability 1 -  ppref no gain will be realized from voting for her most 
preferred party. If the voter does not expect his or her most preferred party 
to be viable then he or she might cast a strategic vote for a less-preferred 
party that is expected to be viable (i.e., ppref < pstrat) in order to avoid 
wasting his or her vote. Given that a strategic choice cannot be the voter's 
most preferred option, the utility from voting strategically has to be lower, 
that is, t/strat 5: ^Pref*
Moreover, not voting for someone's most preferred party might induce 
cognitive dissonances (Festinger 1957), although voters, of course, are 
motivated to avoid that. In general perceived cognitive dissonance does 
not need to have behavioral consequences per se. For instance, from 
public opinion polls we know that people value public spending and hate 
paying taxes. People appear too easily to square with facts that stay in 
logical contrast. What is needed for a cognitive dissonance to arouse and 
to yield behavioral consequences? There has to be an "aversive event" 
(Cooper and Fazio 1984: 232) that the voter expects to happen when 
casting a strategic vote. Arousal of cognitive dissonance might actually 
prevent such a behavior at the polls if despite being important to the 
voter, the perceived consequences of such a vote-choice are deemed to be
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rather unfavorable. Such an "aversive event" could be that not voting for 
the voter's most preferred party is perceived as a threat to the voter's self­
esteem or is expected to lead to an outcome that is counter to the voter's 
self-interest. Voters, however, might be able to a priori reduce the costs of 
a strategic vote. They could justify their voting behavior by attributing the 
responsibility—not voting for their most preferred party—to the specific 
decision-making situation. Clearly, some voters are likely to perceive the 
decision-making situation, which is prestructured by the electoral rules, 
as being in some way coercive (Cooper and Fazio 1984: 236-7).
Therefore it appears safe to assume that voting for a party other than the 
most preferred party imposes additional costs (c) to the voter independent 
of the expected outcome of the election. The expected utility of a strategic 
vote depends, consequently, on the expected gain and the costs of a 
strategic vote. Thus EU(strat) = pstrat * l/strat “
When can we expect a voter to deviate from their most preferred party? 
Following the expectation maximization decision logic, a voter casts a 
strategic vote if and only if EU(strut) > EU(pref), that is, if:
Pstrat ’ ^strat ~  C >  p p ^ t  * t/pref ( 1 )
or equivalently, if
(pstrat * ^strat — 0 / Ppref >  U p re f ( 2 )
The left hand side of this inequality can be interpreted as the risk of 
casting a strategic vote. Voters, then, are predicted to cast a strategic vote 
if these risks outweigh the potential gains from a sincere vote. Given the 
utility and the costs that are expected to come with a strategic vote as 
opposed to a sincere vote, the crucial factor for voters in deciding whether 
to desert or to stick with their most preferred party is the expected 
probability of their most preferred party's chances for winning a seat in 
their electoral district relative to the expected probability that a strategic 
vote is not wasted. Assuming that voters consider only viable parties as 
potential beneficiaries of a strategic choice, that is, they expect pstIat = 1, 
and holding utilities as well as costs constant, the key result from Eq. (2) 
is as follows: the more uncertain voters are whether their most preferred 
party is likely to win, that is, the lower the expected probability ppref, the 
greater the left hand side of this inequality and, consequently, the more 
likely strategic a vote becomes.
What factors determine these expectations? Voting behavior is no dif­
ferent from any other behavior in that it can be explained by institu­
tional as well as dispositional factors. I am going to distinguish between
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dispositional and institutional criteria of how voters generate expect­
ations about the probability that their preferred party is likely to gain 
a seat. Dispositional criteria have on the one hand to do with intrap­
ersonal psychological motivations, with the ability to understand various 
institutional factors and employ them in the decision-making process. On 
the other hand, voting decisions have to do with the use of appropriate 
decision heuristics. Party elites or the media are likely to provide voters 
with cues, and as "cognitive misers" (Fiske and Taylor 1991) voters can 
simply rely on various heuristics to simplify the decision-making process 
(Gschwend 2004: 22-4). Dispositional factors are necessary in order to 
explain the variance of how voters generate their preferences and costs, 
as well as estimate the expected probabilities.
Here, however, individual-level determinants are taken as a starting 
point and aggregate the respondents' vote choices to the electoral district 
level. In doing so omitted dispositional effects are implicitly averaged over 
in order to try to predict the causal effect of institutional criteria. The 
purpose is to see if incentives of a given institutional design make the use 
of the wasted vote strategy at the electoral district level more or less likely*
Institutional Criteria and the Duvergerian Logic
Can we predict the level of strategic voting that should occur in a given 
decision context? Contrary to the approach taken here, the literature on 
institutional effects on elections typically does not focus on voters them­
selves but merely on the predictive implications of their hypothetical 
strategic behavior on the number of parties (e.g., Amorim Neto and Cox 
1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003). The 
first reference point in the literature is Duverger (1954) who discusses the 
impact of institutional factors. In particular, he focuses upon the reduc­
tive effect of electoral systems on party systems due to the mechanism 
whereby voters try to avoid wasting their vote and cast a strategic vote 
for a less-preferred party which they believe has a chance of gaining 
representation. Given the workings of Duverger's proposed dichotomy— 
plurality systems produce strategic voting while PR systems do not— 
the "psychological" effects anticipating the "mechanical" effects of a 
given institutional decision context should operate at least on two levels: 
party elites and voters. Parties have to decide whether to compete in a 
given election, form a preelectoral coalition (Golder 2006; Gschwend and 
Hooghe 2008) or endorse yet another party or coalition that is effectively
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competing for seats. Depending on how party elites coordinate their entry 
into the electoral market the menu or choice-set (Ben-Akiva and Boccara 
1995) may differ even within the same institutional context. For voters 
the expected probability ppref that their most preferred party is viable 
therefore depends on the choices offered to them on the ballot
Duverger would nevertheless predict that the expected probability />pref 
is constant within an electoral system while in terms of disposition 
there should be variance of how voters generate their preferences, costs 
and how they estimate expected probabilities, implicitly averaging those 
dispositional factors, Duverger's theory would predict that the expected 
probability ppref that a given party is viable is higher in PR systems than 
in plurality systems.
Contrary to Duverger, Leys (1959: 13.3) suggests that the effect of insti­
tutional factors varies across districts because a vote for a nationally small 
party might not be automatically wasted in every electoral district. Elec­
toral support for a given partyis often not uniformly distributed across all 
electoral districts. There are electoral strongholds where even a nationally 
small party is likely to gain seats. Consequently Leys would predict that 
the expected probability />pref that an average voter's most preferred party 
in dispositional terms is viable should vary across electoral districts even 
within the same electoral system. Sartori (1968: 278) similarly argues 
that . the influence of PR merely represents an enfeeblement of the 
same influence that is exerted by the plurality systems." He thus expects 
significant amounts of strategic voting even in PR systems.
The Leys-Sartori conjecture becomes relevant for the discussion of insti­
tutional factors that influence voters' expectations of the probability that 
their vote is not wasted on their preferred party. It posits that various 
electoral institutions can be arrayed along a single dimension defined 
by the district magnitude (i.e., by the number of seats awarded in each 
electoral district). The prediction is that the higher the district magnitude, 
the less likely voters are to avoid wasting their vote for smaller parties and, 
hence, the less strategic voting is expected to occur in that district. To put 
it differently, the larger the district magnitude the higher the expected 
probability /7pref that an average voter (in terms of potential dispositional 
criteria) believes their most preferred party is viable. According to Eq. (2), 
the higher the expected probability ppref the less likely such an average 
voter will be to deviate from their most preferred party in order to cast a 
strategic vote.
Finally, it is thought that forming expectations as to whether a par­
ticular party is viable is a difficult task for voters. Some scholars argue
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that strategic voting should fade out when district magnitude is greater 
than 5 because it becomes too complicated to generate expectations about 
which party is able to gain representation (Cox 1997: 100; Cox and 
Shugart 1996: 311). Evidence to support this claim comes from empirical 
regularities based on Japanese and Colombian district level results (Cox 
1997; Cox and Shugart 1996) as well as electoral returns in Spanish dis­
tricts (Cox 1997: 115-7; Gunther 1989). Despite the evidence it remains 
somewhat unclear, however, why voters in larger districts suddenly sys­
tematically overestimated the expected probability /?pref of their preferred 
party's electoral viability in order to vote sincerely for their preferred party 
rather than strategically. To sum up, the literature agrees that there is 
a hypothetical negative relationship between district magnitude as the 
institutional criterion and the frequency of strategic voting in determin­
ing voters' behavior.
Besides this general trend with regard to district magnitude and strategic 
voting, the literature elaborates on two different functional forms of 
this relationship. Some scholars assume a simple linear relationship (e.g., 
Cox 1997; Cox and Shugart 1996) while others argue (e.g., Benoit 2001; 
Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Monroe and Rose 2002; Taagepera 
and Shugart 1989) that the marginal effect of district magnitude on the 
frequency of strategic voting will diminish as the magnitude increases. 
This is consistent with the idea that the expected difference in the 
frequency of strategic voting between a single-member district (as for 
districts in the United States, UK, or Canada) and a district with mag­
nitude of 11 (as in some districts of Slovenia,, Belgium, Sweden, or Spain) 
is more consequential and not at all negligible than in large districts. In 
districts with a magnitude of, say 30 or 40, voters should expect their most 
preferred party to gain representation anyway. No strong reduction in the 
frequency of strategic voting is expected.
Data and Measurement
The Leys-Sartori conjecture has never been tested with individual-level 
data. Most studies in the literature on institutional effects on elections 
employ cross-national data in order to pin down the relationship between 
district magnitude and the size of the party system (e.g., Amorim Neto 
and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 
2003). Scholars who look more closely at strategic voting use district level 
rather than national level data (e.g., Cox 1997; Cox and Shugart 1996;
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Gschwend 2007; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). Nevertheless, employing 
district level data is only an indirect way to assess an individual level 
phenomenon like strategic voting. Heroic assumptions about voters' pref­
erences as well as the well-known problems of ecological fallacy plague the 
process of making inferences based on such a research design. Moreover, 
different strategic voting patterns might even cancel out in the aggregate 
and are therefore lost from any analysis geared at this level of observation. 
Thus, on theoretical grounds, if one is interested in investigating effects 
of electoral institutions on voting behavior, the individual level is the 
preferred level of observation to carry out analyses of strategic voting. 
With survey data it is possible to measure (sincere) preferences of a given 
respondent directly and compare it to their stated voting behavior. This 
is a great advantage compared to all studies that look only at aggre­
gated election results because one does not need to make any additional 
assumption about voters' preferences in order to distinguish strategic from 
other voting behavior.
The CSES project is an ideal data set for this approach. It is a cross­
national project with election studies across countries with great variance 
in their electoral institutions,^ variance which also provides comparable 
individual level data. Moreover, systematic information about character­
istics of the primary electoral districts as well as the electoral system at 
large is merged to the individual data. Thus, the CSES data (Module 1) 
is especially suitable for study of the effects of electoral institutions on 
citizens' attitudes and behavior.
The comparative literature on strategic voting and electoral systems 
traditionally speaks to the (primary electoral) district level because this is 
the level where the institutional effects should operate. I will choose the 
same level of observation in order to assess the consequences of varying 
district magnitude on the frequency of strategic voting.
The dependent variable is the fraction of all voters per electoral district 
who cast a strategic vote. In order to construct this variable it is necessary 
to derive voters' preference rankings of parties which actually field lists or 
candidates in a particular electoral district, that is, after elite coordination 
took place that might have reduced the number of available options on 
the ballot.3 This accounts for the complications that even within the same 
country voters do not necessarily have the same choice-set and that their 
vote choices might be menu dependent. Party preferences are measured 
by standard 10-point party like-dislike scales and ranked accordingly for 
each respondent.4
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According to my conceptualization, a strategic vote following the 
Duvergerian logic is a vote for a less-preferred party if the expected utility 
that this party is electorally viable is higher than the expected utility of 
the preferred party gaining a seat in the district. Unfortunately, it cannot 
be directly assessed how individuals form their expectations about the 
viability of a party, no matter how they weigh their preferences against 
those expectations. This holds in most CSES countries where the common 
module was administered as part of a postelection study. Thus I have to 
employ some simplifying assumptions.
In a single-member district the two parties expected to be first and 
second are considered viable to gain this seat (Cox 1997).The larger the 
district magnitude the more parties will be viable. Conceptually, voters 
have to calculate the expected probabilities for their most preferred party 
to get the last seat in a multimember district in order to decide whether 
their vote might be wasted. Particularly in large districts with many parties 
this will be quite difficult. Given the complexity it might be more reason­
able to assume that "viability" of a given party is perceived differently in 
such districts. It is assumed that voters simply form expectations, whether 
or not parties gain a seat in a particular electoral district. As such, parties 
that are expected to win a seat are perceived as viable parties in that elect­
oral district. Employing this heuristic is easier than calculating expected 
probabilities for parties winning the last district seat and, moreover, it is 
easily available since voters can infer this from previous election results.
There is also a methodological warning associated with attempts to 
operationalize the concept of "viability" for parties in multimember dis­
tricts using CSES data. These data cover vote shares of up to six parties at 
the district level. There is no information in the CSES data, however, as 
to whether those parties in fact actually came first, second, third, and 
so forth. The parties covered by CSES are not automatically the most 
successful parties in every electoral district. There is always the possibility 
that independent candidates or parties not covered by the CSES could 
have been more successful in a particular district than parties that are cov­
ered by the CSES. Thus from ranking district-level results of the available 
parties one cannot reliably asses the "viability" of a given party.
In order to get a measure for voters' expectations about a party's elec­
toral viability the concept was defined as "coming in first or second" in 
single-member districts and as "gaining at least a seat" in multimember 
districts. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Cain 1978; Gschwend 2004; 
Karp et al. 2002: 8), it is assumed that on average voters' expectations are
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correct, that is, they expect a party to be viable (or to gain a seat) if the 
party actually ends up first or second (or winning a seat) in that district
Consequently, the dependent variable is coded as the proportion of 
respondents per electoral district who cast their vote for a less-preferred 
party if that party comes in first or second (in single-member districts), or 
wins a seat in their electoral district (in multimember districts) when the 
preferred party does not. This group of strategic voters is most likely to 
follow the Duvergerian logic to avoid wasting their vote,5 The advantage 
of such strategic voting is that it disentangles strategic voters following 
a wasted-vote strategy from voting behavior that can be interpreted as 
a result of other strategies (Blais et al. 2001), Thus the frequencies of 
strategic voting are not falsely magnified as if we would take, for instance, 
simply every deviation from someone's most preferred party as a strategic 
vote. In order to construct a measure of which party gained seats in a 
given electoral district this information was compiled separately from 
country-specific data sources and merged with the CSES data. The group of 
nonstrategic voters is comprised of all other voters, for example, sincere 
voters or voters of a party that is on the ballot in a respective electoral 
district but not being evaluated on the corresponding party like—dislike 
scale.
Some Descriptive Results
The empirical section of this chapter begins by providing an overview of 
the independent and the dependent variables. In the following analysis, 
all CSES election studies are included which passed a data consistency 
test and provided the relevant variables. Thus, countries without any 
parliamentary vote-choice variable were not included in the analysis 
(Belarus, Chile, Lithuania, Peru 2000); nor were countries where district 
level information is not available (Taiwan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine, and 
Thailand).
There are 1,949 electoral districts in the CSES election studies where 
seats are distributed at least partly on the local district level. The district 
magnitude varies between 1 and 48. The distribution of this variable is 
extremely skewed. About 80 percent of the observations have a district 
magnitude of 1. However, the respective seat allocation rules that deter­
mine the winner in such districts vary to some extent. Besides the single­
member plurality districts of Canada, the UK, and the United States, 
there are also Australian alternative vote districts as well as the SMD-tier
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Mexico '97 -  
New Zealand, SM D '96 -  
Germany, SM D '98 -  
United Kingdom *96 -  
Japan, SMD '96 -  
Poland '97 - 
Canada '97 - 
Hong Kong '98 
Spain '96 - 
Portugal '02 - 
Mexico '00 - 
Romania '96 -  
Peru '01 -  
Australia '96 - 
Switzerland '99 - 
Denmark '98 -  
New Zealand, PR ‘96 -  
Slovenia'96 -  
Hungary, SM D '98 -  
Iceland '99 -  
Hungary, PR ’98 -  
Norway '97 -  
Belgium '99 -  
Sweden '98 -  
Spain '00 -  
Japan, PR 9^6 -  
Hong Kong ’00 -  
Czech Republic '96 -  
United States '96 -  
The Netherlands'98 - 
Israel *96 -  
Germany, PR '98 -
T "
10
~T
12
Frequency of Strategic Voting
Figure 13.1. Frequency of strategic voting by election study—CSES Module 1
districts of all mixed-electoral systems (including the single ballot sys­
tem of Mexico). If the Netherlands and Israel are also included—two 
countries where the primary electoral district is at the national level, 
and the available PR-tier districts of the two-ballot mixed electoral sys­
tems that are covered by CSES Module 1 (Germany, Hungary, Japan, 
and New Zealand)—the number of observations increases by 35 to 
1,984. Those PR-tier districts have district magnitudes that range from 4 
(Hungarians' PR-tier is composed of regional multimember districts) to 
656 (Germany).
The dependent variable is the proportion of respondents per electoral 
district who cast their vote for a less-preferred party if that party comes in 
first or second (in single-member districts), or a party which wins a seat 
in their electoral district (in multimember districts) when the preferred 
party does not. In order to capture the distribution Figure 13.1 provides 
summary statistics while summing up the observed levels of strategic 
voting at the electoral districts within every election study.
Figure 13.1 shows that there is considerable variation in the frequency 
of strategic voting even on a more aggregate level. It is reassuring that 
based on my measurement strategy one does not find any strategic voting 
where votes are essentially never wasted. In neither of two PR systems
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with very low thresholds—Israel and the Netherlands—is strategic voting 
discernable. At most 10-12 percent of the voters follow the wasted-vote 
logic. These high rates are observed in the SMD-tier of some mixed- 
electoral systems. The variation is even stronger at the electoral district 
level. In the following section electoral districts are chosen as the level of 
analysis because the hypothesized institutional effects should be present 
at this level.
District Magnitude and the Frequency of Strategic Voting
What is the relationship between district magnitude and the frequency of 
strategic voting? Theory suggests that it should be a negative relationship: 
the lower the district magnitude the higher a voter's expectation that their 
vote will be wasted because parties find it more difficult to win seats. So 
far, there is no agreement reached about the functional form. Moreover 
we should expect a sudden decline of strategic voting in electoral districts 
with a district magnitude greater than 5 if the "fading-out" argument 
is correct. The CSES provides an opportunity to examine these issues 
empirically.
The fraction of strategic voting per district is calculated over a different 
number of grouped individuals and bounded between 0 and 1. I follow 
the advice of the econometric literature on how to deal with this type 
of response data (e.g., Papke and Wooldridge 1996) and will later employ 
a generalized linear model (GLM) with a logit link. This particular esti­
mation strategy makes it possible to appropriately model the binomial 
data generation process at the electoral district level, while at the same 
time accounting for the fact that the precision of those fractions depends 
on the number of respondents within each electoral district. The logit 
link finally makes sure that the model predictions are bounded between 
0 and 1.
When modeling the fraction of strategic voting per district the current 
theory does not offer any clear guidance as to which functional form 
for the district magnitude should be used. Therefore, I start by fitting a 
slightly more flexible model, a generalized additive model (GAM) (Beck 
and Jackman 1998), to the data to avoid any parametric restrictions for 
district magnitude as the sole predictor of the expected frequency of 
strategic voting at the district level.
Figure 13.2 displays the fractions of strategic voting as predicted by 
a smooth function (estimated through a cubic smoothing spline; based
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District Magnitude
Figure 13.2. Smooth function of district magnitude and the frequency of strategic 
voting
on 5 df) of the district magnitude together with pointwise 95 percent 
confidence intervals as solid and dashed lines, respectively. While the 
circles represent the actual district level fractions of strategic voting, the 
size of the circles is proportional to the number of respondents that were 
interviewed in that district. To maximize readability outlying districts 
(about 6 percent) are excluded from Figure 13.2.
The analysis reveals that it is very difficult to obtain a precise predic­
tion of the level of strategic voting in the districts based on the district 
magnitude as sole predictor. The variability of the observed fraction of 
strategic voting is quite high even for electoral districts of the same dis­
trict magnitude. Nevertheless, electoral districts that have unexpectedly 
high fractions of strategic voting are mostly displayed with small circles 
indicating that these fractions are based on small numbers of respondents 
only.
In general though, the figure supports the expectation that there is 
a negative relationship between district magnitude and the number of 
strategic voters in a given electoral district. This is consistent with the the­
ory that the larger the district magnitude the higher voters' expectations
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ppref that their most preferred party is viable in that district and, con­
sequently, the less likely they are to cast a strategic vote. Moreover, the 
expected decrease of strategic voting seems to be rather smooth. There is 
no evidence, at least in these data, for the argument advanced by Cox and 
Shugart (1996) and Cox (1997) of a sudden decline of strategic voting in 
electoral districts with a district magnitude greater than 5. Instead, there is 
some strategic voting even in electoral districts of large district magnitude. 
The analysis thus far has moved beyond the dominant case study design 
logic that characterizes the literature on strategic voting, establishing 
that there is a negative relationship between district magnitude and the 
frequency of strategic voting even if one looks at electoral districts cross- 
nationally.
What can be said about the functional form of the relationship between 
district magnitude and the frequency of strategic voting? The literature 
does not offer clear guidance. Comparing the model fit of a GLM with a 
GAM using the same dependent and independent variables allows one to 
assess how reasonable the linearity constraint is for the predictors d is t r ic t  
m a g n it u d e  or log(DlSTRlCT MAGNITUDE) in a GLM. If all predictors in a 
GAM are modeled linearly (i.e., df = 1) then such a model is equivalent 
to a GLM. Now, if the deviance increases (significantly) when a linear 
predictor is used instead of a smooth function (i.e., df > 1), that is, the 
model fit gets worse, then the smooth functions of the predictors show 
significant signs of nonlinearity. Appropriate significance tests show that 
there are neither significant nonlinearities when one uses DISTRICT m a g ­
n itu d e  nor log (d is t r ic t  m a g n it u d e ) for electoral districts where seats are 
distributed at least partly on the local district level and the district magni­
tude varies between 1 and 48. Consequently for such electoral districts the 
linearity constraint of the predictors is not really consequential substan­
tively. Scholars can employ either functional form, DISTRICT m a g n itu d e  
or log(DlSTRiCT m a g n itu d e ). No gain can be made by going nonparamet- 
ric. However, if the PR-tier districts are included, and, consequently, the 
district magnitude ranges between 1 and 656, d is t r ic t  MAGNITUDE shows 
signs of nonlinearity while log  (DISTRICT MAGNITUDE) does not. This implies 
that when adding those 35 PR-tier districts to the sample—some of which 
have very large district magnitudes (New Zealand: 120; Israel: 120; the 
Netherlands: 150; Germany: 656)—scholars should rather use log(DiSTRlCT 
MAGNITUDE) instead of DISTRICT MAGNITUDE as a predictor when modeling 
such effects.
All told, the assessment of the controversy in the literature about the 
appropriate functional form when modeling district magnitude yields
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Table 13.1. Generalized linear models predicting the frequency of strategic voting as 
a function of district magnitude
Dependent variable: fraction of strategic voting
Excluding PR All districts Excluding PR All districts
DISTRICT -0.104 (0.032)** -0.015(0.010)
MAGNITUDE
log(DlSTRICT I o Ui 00 (A) * o o "vl -0.492 (0.115)**
MAGNITUDE)
Constant -2.622 (0.097)** -3.036(0.081)** -2.631 (0.046)** -2.671 (0.062)**
AIC 2.20 2.45 2.16 2.24
BIC -11,996 -11,740 -12,074 -12,157
N 1949 1984 1949 1984
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1 %.
a Solomonic sentence at least in light of the dependent variable used 
here. As long as the district magnitudes of the electoral districts are not 
greater than 50, that is, for almost all electoral districts that are cov­
ered by the CSES module, it does not make a huge difference whether 
DISTRICT MAGNITUDE or log(DlSTRlCT m a g n itu d e) is used. This is true as 
long as there is an appropriate link function that permits out-of-bound 
predictions.
Finally it is worthwhile to look at the estimation results from a GLM 
predicting the level of strategic voting conditional on institutional effects 
that get channeled through the district magnitude. To facilitate a compari­
son across functional forms—either DISTRICT m a g n itu d e  or log(DlSTRlCT 
m a g n it u d e ) as predictor, as well as samples which either exclude (n =
1,949) or include (n  = 1,984) the PR-tier districts—Table 13.1 presents the 
estimation results across all four models.
Three out of four models yield essentially the same result The incen­
tives that get channeled through the district magnitude are in fact system­
atically related to the frequency of strategic voting at the electoral district 
level. No matter which functional form is used for the predictor variable, 
the relationship is negative: lower district magnitudes yield more strategic 
voting. Merely the inclusion of the large PR-tier districts of New Zealand, 
Israel, the Netherlands, and Germany cause problems when one attempts 
to model DISTRICT MAGNITUDE without transforming it. Moreover, the 
smaller samples excluding all PR-tier districts always yield better predic­
tions given the presented fit indices even when the same functional form 
is used. Smaller values for the Akaike (AIC) as well as the Bayesian (BIC) 
information criterion, indicate better fitting models. Finally, the model fit
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Figure 13.3. Comparison of model predictions across three estimated relation­
ships between district magnitude and the frequency of strategic voting
is consistently slightly better when one uses log(DiSTRlCT m a g n it u d e ) as 
the independent variable.
How large are the predicted differences in strategic voting across dif­
ferent models? In Figure 13.3, three functions are plotted to predict the 
frequency of strategic voting across a wide range of district magnitude. 
The range of the independent variable, which is shown on the horizontal 
axes, comprises more than 99 percent of the electoral districts in the 
CSES Module 1 data. There are two thick lines. The dashed line represents 
the GLM predictions based on the model where DISTRICT MAGNITUDE is 
untransformed while the dashed line separated by dots represents the 
respective predictions where log(DlSTRlCT m a g n it u d e ) is the independent 
variable. The solid thin line corresponds to the GAM predictions from 
before.
Almost consistently the GAM predictions yield the highest district-level 
estimates for strategic voting across all three models. The GLM predictions 
with DISTRICT m a g n it u d e  as untransformed predictor suggest the lowest 
levels of strategic voting across all three models when the district mag­
nitude is larger than 15 and, consequently, the model with log(DiSTR!CT 
m a g n itu d e) as independent variable predicts comparatively the lowest
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levels of strategic voting for districts with smaller district magnitudes. 
The predicted differences across those models are largest in small districts 
with a district magnitude between 2 and 4 and differ not more than by 
about 2.5 percentage points. For more than 90 percent of the districts 
in the sample the model predictions differ by less than 1 percentage 
point from one another. Thus in most situations the differences across 
the three models have little substantive relevance. Depending on how the 
relationship between district magnitude and the frequency of strategic 
voting is modeled one can expect on average around 6-8 percent of 
strategic voting in single member districts, while for electoral districts 
with a district magnitude of greater than 10 we should not expect to find 
more than about 2 percent strategic voters.
Conclusion
The workings of electoral laws have profound and well-known conse­
quences for the party system, the type of government, and the nature 
of representation in general. It also has an impact on the way people 
make decisions in the voting booth. Some voters anticipate the out­
come of an election because they form expectations about it and act 
accordingly. The ways these expectations play out seem to be system­
atically related to institutional factors that prestructure a voter's choice 
situation. Since voting behavior is not only determined by institutions I 
conceptually distinguished institutional and dispositional criteria of how 
voters generate expectations about the probability of a vote cast for their 
preferred party going to waste. For this study I focused on the institutional 
criteria that operate at the primary district level, possibly moderating 
voters' expectations and thus causing them to deviate from supporting 
their preferred party. These individual-level mechanisms have predictable 
implications for the frequency of strategic voting at the electoral district 
level.
The results of this study provide evidence that the level of strategic 
voting at the district level is related to district magnitude. Leys (1959) and 
Sartori (1968) suggested this long ago: The higher the district magnitude 
the less strategic voting we should expect. For the first time this study 
provides evidence for this relationship that holds across various electoral 
systems. Depending on how this relationship is modeled one can expect 
on average around 6-8 percent strategic voters in single-member districts. 
Nevertheless even in districts with a large district magnitude, contrary to
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what Duverger would have predicted, one can still systematically observe 
strategic voting although at a very low level.
Although this negative relationship seems to be quite robust, there is 
still a great deal of variance that is not accounted for even when compar­
ing the levels of strategic voting in electoral districts of the same district 
magnitude. It might be that the institutional incentives that are chan­
neled through the district magnitude and supposedly moderate a voter's 
expectation formation process differ across types of electoral systems. For 
instance, are the incentives to cast a strategic vote in a single-member 
district in Australia (employing an alternative vote system) systematically 
different from the ones in Canada, the UK, or the United States or even 
from the SMD-tier districts in mixed electoral systems? Further research 
should seek to identify the mechanism by which other institutional 
effects potentially moderate the incentives that are channeled through 
the district magnitude.
The controversy in the literature surrounding the functional form of 
those district magnitude effects appears to be somewhat suspect. At least 
based on the analysis of the Module 1 CSES data the basis of disagreement 
is lost. It simply does not make a significant difference whether the district 
magnitude is logistically transformed or not. My sense is that the contro­
versy should be rather around how we model the dependent variable on 
which the district magnitude should have an impact. A typical dependent 
variable in this controversy is certainly the "effective number of parties" 
(Laakso and Taagepera 1979). It may be more useful to theorize about the 
data generating mechanism behind such a concept rather than arguing 
about transformations of independent variables. This would also seem to 
be a more promising approach with regard to policy applications of the 
research.
Notes
1. I thank Kerstin Honig for valuable research assistance and Martin Elff for helpful 
comments.
2. To simplify language I will just refer to political parties, even if voters can 
explicitly vote for candidates. Since I am looking at parliamentary elections, 
candidates are typically affiliated with a party list.
3. If the mechanism behind the Leys-Sartori conjecture were merely driven by 
elite coordination instead of strategic behavior of voters, marginal parties would 
not even contest an election. The implication for voters would be that they have 
no opportunity to waste their votes in the first place. Thus, the observed level
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of strategic voting is driven by strategic behavior of voters in anticipation of the 
decision context and cannot be attributed to elite coordination.
4. In mixed systems I take the SMD vote as relevant vote choice since only in the 
majoritarian tier one expects an impact of the district magnitude. In order to 
do that I assume that party and candidate preferences coincide for voters who 
do not vote for the candidate of their most preferred party but for a more viable 
candidate.
5. If respondents simultaneously prefer two parties when one party is expected 
to be viable and the other party is not such a vote is counted as having been 
cast for the viable party as a strategic vote since not including expectations in 
voters' decision calculus could have resulted in a vote for a party with a lower 
expected utility
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